Remove ECC-GOST from active use within DNSSEC

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Table of Contents

1. Introduction

The security of the ECC-GOST algorithm [RFC5933] has been slowly diminishing over time as various forms of attacks have weakened its cryptographic underpinning. Thus, the use of ECC-GOST is no longer needed and is not recommend for use in DNSSEC [RFC4033] [RFC4034] [RFC4035].¶

This document retires the use of ECC-GOST within DNSSEC.¶

2. Deprecating ECC-GOST algorithms in DNSSEC

The ECC-GOST [RFC5933] algorithm MUST NOT be used when creating DS records. Validating resolvers MUST treat DS records as insecure. If no other DS records of accepted cryptographic algorithms are available, the DNS records below the delegation point MUST be treated as insecure.¶

The ECC-GOST [RFC5933] algorithm MUST NOT be used when creating DNSKEY and RRSIG records. Validating resolvers MUST treat RRSIG records created from DNSKEY records using these algorithms as insecure. If no other RRSIG records of accepted cryptographic algorithms are available, the validating resolver MUST consider the associated resource records as Bogus.¶

3. Security Considerations

This document increases the security of the DNSSEC ecosystem by deprecating algorithms that make use of older algorithms with ECC-GOST derived uses.¶

4. Operational Considerations

Zone owners currently making use of ECC-GOST based algorithms should immediate switch to algorithms with stronger cryptographic strengths, such as those listed in the introduction. DNS registries [RFC8499] should prohibit their clients to upload and publish ECC-GOST based DS records.¶

5. IANA Considerations

IANA is requested to set the "DNSSEC Validation" of the "Digest Algorithms" registry [DS-IANA] for ECC-GOST (3) to MUST NOT.¶

IANA is requested to set the "Recommended for DNSSEC Validation" column of the DNS Security Algorithm Numbers registry [DNSKEY-IANA] for ECC-GOST (23) to MUST NOT:¶

Appendix A. Acknowledgments

TBD¶

Appendix B. Current algorithm usage levels

The DNSSEC scanning project by Viktor Dukhovni and Wes Hardaker highlights the current deployment of various algorithms on the https://stats.dnssec-tools.org/ website.¶

[RFC Editor: please delete this section upon publication]¶

Appendix C. Github Version of this document

While this document is under development, it can be viewed, tracked, fill here:¶

https://github.com/hardaker/draft-hardaker-dnsop-must-not-sha1¶

Authors' Addresses