]> Siemens

hofmann.benedikt@siemens.com

Siemens

hannes.tschofenig@gmx.net

Nokia

edoardo.giordano@nokia.com

Zscaler

yrosomakho@zscaler.com

Microsoft

arndts.ietf@gmail.com

Security WIMSE Internet-Draft The use of the OAuth 2.0 framework for container orchestration systems poses a challenge as managing secrets, such as client_id and client_secret, can be complex and error-prone. "Service account token volume projection", a term introduced by Kubernetes, provides a way of injecting JSON Web Tokens (JWTs) to workloads. This document describes the current best practices to avoid client_secret provisioning and leverage platform attestation to receive access tokens from an OAuth 2.0 authorization server via RFC 7523.

Introduction In workload scenarios dedicated management entities, also referred to as "control plane" entities, are used to start, monitor and stop workloads dynamically. These workloads frequently interact with each other and other entities within the corporate network or online. When one workload, acting as an OAuth client, wants to gain access to a protected resource hosted on another workload or on the Internet (referred here generically as a resource server) then authorization is typically required. To authenticate workloads accessing resources, each workload instance requires unique credentials. This poses challenges in environments where workloads start, stop, relocate, and scale dynamically. Manual configuration, rotation, and management efforts can result in management overhead at best and security risks such as credential exposure at worst. "Service account token volume projection" is a feature in the Kubernetes container orchestration system that enables users to attach platform-attested tokens to their workloads. Workloads use these tokens to authenticate themselves to APIs within the platform's control plane. While this token is used for access, it functions more like an ID Token rather than an Access Token in the OAuth context. Workloads do not receive a refresh token, and there is no involvement of authorization or consent; it simply serves as proof of the workload's identity. Workloads have several methods to obtain such tokens from Kubernetes, including through the TokenRequest API invoked by business logic or Token volume projection, which mounts the token into the workload's file system and ensures it remains up-to-date. Token volume projection offers the advantage of requiring no manual intervention by the application beyond reading a file. Initially designed to authenticate access to the control plane API, the industry has recognized the service account token for its low maintenance and platform attestation capabilities and has started using it as a JWT client assertion, as specified in . This token is presented to an authorization server as a client assertion. The authorization server validates the assertion's signature using metadata or and uses the claims within the token to authenticate the client. Overall, the authorization server trusts the platform control plane for issuing and delivering these credentials. The authorization server then responds with an Access Token that the workload can use to access an OAuth2-protected resource on a resource server. illustrates the interaction in the architecture graphically.

| Resource | | Account|| +----------+| | Access | Server | | Token || +----------+ | Token | | | || ^ | +----------+ | || Start Workload: | | || with Service : | | || Account Token : | | || v | | || +-------+ | | |+------------->| | | | +---------------| Agent | | | | | | | +-------+ | | | +-------------------------------------+ ]]>

This specification defines the utilization of Service Account Tokens within container orchestration systems, providing a secure and scalable method for creating and managing these tokens while ensuring interoperability with existing OAuth-based authorization systems. To distinguish between entities, we refer to the OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server within the cluster's control plane as the "Control Plane." Given the presence of two distinct access tokens, we specifically designate the token issued by the Control Plane as the "Service Account Token," thereby differentiating it from the access token issued to an OAuth 2.0 client operating within the workload by a separate authorization server. In , further details are provided regarding the token content and the associated security properties.

Terminology The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here. The terms 'workload' and 'container' are used interchangeably.

Recommendations This specification relies on the use of OAuth 2.0 and for client authentication using a JWT. Service Account Tokens used in container orchestration systems are vulnerable to various threats, as outlined below: Token theft: Attackers who compromise a workload can steal tokens to impersonate it and gain unauthorized access to resources. Token reuse: Stolen tokens may be reused within their expiration period to gain repeated unauthorized access. However, the expiration time limits the token reuse time window. Misconfigured service accounts: mproperly configured service accounts can grant applications excessive privileges. Theft of token signing key: Attackers gaining control plane access can steal the token signing key, akin to compromising client_id and client_secret in OAuth, potentially accessing all secrets in the orchestration system. The following fields are populated in the Service Account Token: The 'iss' claim MUST contain a string identifying the worklod orchestrator. The 'sub' claim MUST contain a string identifying the workload, also serving as the client_id per . The 'aud' claim MUST identify one or multiple authorization servers intended to receive and authorize the Service Account Token. Additional processing requirements are specified in .

Security Considerations This entire document is about security.

IANA Considerations This document does not require actions by IANA.

Acknowledgements Add your name here.

In many standards track documents several words are used to signify the requirements in the specification. These words are often capitalized. This document defines these words as they should be interpreted in IETF documents. This document specifies an Internet Best Current Practices for the Internet Community, and requests discussion and suggestions for improvements. This specification defines the use of a JSON Web Token (JWT) Bearer Token as a means for requesting an OAuth 2.0 access token as well as for client authentication. The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework enables a third-party application to obtain limited access to an HTTP service, either on behalf of a resource owner by orchestrating an approval interaction between the resource owner and the HTTP service, or by allowing the third-party application to obtain access on its own behalf. This specification replaces and obsoletes the OAuth 1.0 protocol described in RFC 5849. [STANDARDS-TRACK] RFC 2119 specifies common key words that may be used in protocol specifications. This document aims to reduce the ambiguity by clarifying that only UPPERCASE usage of the key words have the defined special meanings. This specification defines a metadata format that an OAuth 2.0 client can use to obtain the information needed to interact with an OAuth 2.0 authorization server, including its endpoint locations and authorization server capabilities. Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and C. Mortimore

Example The functionality described in this specification can be verified using Kubernetes. Modern version of Kubernetes implement service account token volume projection, which enables the ability to inject the Service Account Token with a specific issuer and audience into the workload. A most important parts of the configuration are (which can be found at the end of the full configuration): the path, where the application can find the token, as a file the expiration of the token in seconds the audience, which will be in the Service Account Token

The full configuration is shown below:

The most important parts of the token, which the workload will obtain, looks as follows:

A complete token example obtained by the workload is shown below.

To enable the authorization server to use the Service Account Token for client authentication the following configuration is needed: the client id is set to system:serviceaccount:test:default. In our case we are using the default service account in the test namespace. the public key of the token signing key. This can be either configured manually, or dynamically by referencing the JWK endpoint Kubernetes exposes, which is https://kubernetes.default.svc.cluster.local/openid/v1/jwks Note: Authorization servers that follow the OpenID Connect Core specification, which profiles RFC 7523, will unfortunately run into problem. Here is the why. For JWT-based client authentication specifies the following: The 'jti' claim is mandated for client authentication. The 'iss' claim must match the 'sub' claim. Since Kubernetes issues the tokens, and not the workload, the two do not match. , on the other hand, does not mandate the use of a 'jti' claim and does not mandate that the 'iss' claim equals the 'sub' claim.